INDIA-BANGLADESH RELATIONS

INDIA-BANGLADESH RELATIONS
ISSUES, PROBLEMS AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Bangladesh,  shares  4094  kilometers  of  land border with India on three sides, the
fourth  side  being  open  to  the  Bay  of  Bengal.   Various issues  need  to  be  resolved if  the
relationship  between  the  two  are  to  be  improved,  from  sharing  the  water  of  54 international rivers  that  flow  from  India  to  Bangladesh  to  controlling  terrorism  and promoting economic development.

I

TRADE 

The  trade  relationship  has  had  a  detrimental  effect  on  bilateral  relationship.  The  geographicalproximity  of India to Bangladesh has made it one of  its biggest trading partners.   There  are pressing  concerns  in  Bangladesh  regarding  the  large  bilateral  trade  deficit  with  India  and  the large  volumes  of  informal  imports  from  India  across  the  land  border  which  avoid Bangladeshi  import  duties.  Bangladesh’s  bilateral trade deficit with India has been 

increasing  rapidly  on  average  at  about  9.5%  annually.  However,  the  deficit  narrowed  for  the first  time  in  fiscal  year  2005/06 when Bangladesh’s exports rose  to  $242  million  while  India’s exports  fell  to $1.8 billion  from $2 billion in officially  recorded  exports.  For  Bangladesh,  India has now become the largest single source  of its imports.  Political  discontentment  in  Bangladesh
tends  to  stem  from  the  huge  trade  gap, supported by  the  fact  that  India has a lot of  non  trade barriers  for  Bangladeshi exports.  Even  though  exports  from Bangladesh are growing at a healthy pace, there is no sign of reducing this trade gap. The non trade barriers, as pointed out by Bangladesh Commerce Ministry, and cited by the Daily Star include:
 Laboratory  tests  in  Bangladesh, especially  for  food  products, cosmetics,  and  leather  and             textiles products.
 Packaging requirements
 Inadequate  infrastructure  facilities such  as  warehousing,  transshipment yard, parking yard and
 Connecting  roads  at  land  customs stations  also  hinder  exports  from Bangladesh;  the  la border  trade  is subject to very serious administrative constraints  in  Bangladesh.
The  most important  of  the  Customs  posts  with comprehensive  Customs  clearance powers is at Benapole, which borders Petrapole  on  the  Indian  side  and which  is  on  main  roads  linking Kolkata with Jessore and Dhaka.  As  per  the  report  by  Bangladesh Commerce  Ministry,  trade  barriers include:
 Imposition of state tax
 Anti‐dumping (AD) is one of the WTO‐legitimate  measures  introduced  by India during the 1990s,
 Countervailing duties 90%  of  industrial  tariffs  are  now  at 12.5%,  far  lower  and  far  more  uniform then  they  have  ever  been  in  the  past  50
years.
From  the  perspective  of  SAARC countries,  including  Bangladesh,  these changes  mean  that Indian  domestic markets,  for  most  manufactured  goods, are  highly  competitive,  with  prices that are close to world prices, and are likely to be  difficult  to  penetrate  even  with complete exemption from  Indian  tariffs under  bilateral  or  multilateral  free  trade arrangements  such  as those  planned under SAFTA.  Illegal and Informal Trade
Informal  trade  carried  out  through porous  land  border  between  India  and Bangladesh  adds  to the  trade  deficit, dating  back  to  the  initial  years  of Bangladesh’s  birth.  The  substantial, nformal and  unrecorded  trade,  carried across  the  India‐Bangladesh    border,  is more  quasi  legal in nature,  and  is  often described as ‘informal’ rather than illegal, since  there is   wide  participation  of local people in the border areas who operate in iaison  with  the  anti‐smuggling enforcement agencies.  Informal  trade  of this kind often involves large numbers of
local  people  individually  transporting small quantities as head loads or through bicycle rickshaws, also known as ‘bootleg’smuggling.  Another  kind  of  informal  trade,  termed ‘technical’  smuggling, involves  explicit illegal  practices  such  as  under  invoicing, misclassification  and  bribery  of Customs and  other  officials.  During  the  1990’s about  three  quarters  of  imports  were  by
land and sea which has recently shown a decline  to  between  50%  and  60%.  The cause  of concern for  Bangladesh,  thus,  is more  intense  than  that  of  India,  since much  larger  volumes  of  goods are smuggled  from  India  to  Bangladesh escaping  customs  duties.  Trade  deficit  is intertwined with  other  issues  like  trans‐shipment,  transit  and  export  of  natural gas, one of the natural resource possessed by the independent nation of Bangladesh.  In a recent visit to India, Mr. H.E. Tariq A. Karim, Bangladesh High Commissioner to India at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New  Delhi  noted  that  “…if  India were  to  facilitate Bangladesh’s exports  to India  by  completely removing  all  tariff and  non‐tariff  barriers,  then  the  loss  in revenues  to  India  from  duties  and levies would  be  insignificant  while  in  return, huge goodwill will be created…”5 which is
actually  essential  for  a  progressive relationship between two democracies.

II

TRANSIT

Transit  was  used  by  India  with  Pakistan till  the 1965 war, after which it declined, but  with  the consequent  emergence  of Bangladesh,  it  failed  to  change. Immediately  after Bangladeshiindependence, it allowed transit in air and sea  routes  to  India while  the major issue of transit  through  road  remained unattended. While air  transit is  still widely  used  than water  transit, it  has  been  considered uncompetitive  over  the  years.  The  goods carried  from  the  Northeast  of India reaches  the  mainland  after  traversing Assam  and  North  Bengal,  taking  a  route much longer  than  what  could  have  been the shortest  through Bangladesh.  In spite of India’s frequent attempts to pursue the Bangladesh  government  to  open  transit for its economic activities, even at the cost of  a  hefty  sum,  it  has  been  continuously refused  on  grounds  that  it  is  a  possible
threat to national security. Transshipment versus Transit Transshipment  refers  to  the  shipment  of
goods  or  containers  to  an  intermediate destination,  and  then  to  yet  another
destination.  This  has  been  achieved  by India in its  relationship with Bangladesh. Transit  refers  to the  passage  of  Indian good  across  Bangladeshi  borders  to  and from  the  North  Eastern  states of Indian owned  surface  transport,  while transshipment may also refer to the same movement using Bangladesh‐owned transport.  This  remains  an  issue  of contention.  Bangladesh,  on  the  31  May, 2010  signed an agreement  to  finalize a  transshipment deal  with  India  to  allow  Indian  goods  to
be transported to the northeastern city of Tripura  in  the  state  of  Assam  through
Bangladeshi territory. Anything produced in  the  northeast  region  of  India  faces  the difficulty  of  marketing  to  the  rest  of  the country,  the  main  reason  being  the distance  to  the  port  of Kolkata.  With globalization  and  the  policy  of liberalization  no  foreign  or  private company is   going  to be inclined  to invest in the north‐east corner of India owing to several  hassles,  including the  rise  in transportation  cost.  Thus  hampering  the development of the north eastern market.  To deal  with  such  logistical  problems  of linking  the  Northeast  with  the  rest  of India,  New Delhi is left  with  the  only option  of  urging  the  reopening  of  the
northeastern  routes  through  Bangladesh to its West, and with Myanmar and south‐East  Asia  to  the East.  The  region  that  is also  rich in energy  resources like natural gas  and  hydro‐electricity  can progress, thus addressing problems that give rise to long‐  standing  grievances,  which  in  turn encourage  insurgency  surrounding  the region. The  benefits  of  transit  facility  between India  and Bangladesh  are  not  limited  to the Indian growth list. Bangladesh, whose average  GDP  is  6%  per year,  can  also become a regional hub.  Role of the Asian Development Bank
ADB  (Asian  Development  Bank)  Country Director Hua Du, pointed out in a seminar to Bangladesh,  “You  can  benefit tremendously  through  opening  up  of transit  and  great opportunities  for crossing  from east to west and giving the land‐locked  neighbours  access  to  the
sea.”6
The  controversial  issue  of  connecting Bangladesh  to  the  Asian  Highway  is sustained  by  the anti  Indian  groups  in Bangladesh.  The  Asian  highway,  also known  as  the  Great  Asian Highway,  is  a cooperative  project  among  countries  in Asia  and  Europe  and  the  United  Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and  the  Pacific  [ESCAP],  to  improve  the highway systems  in  Asia.  Anti‐India groups  in  Bangladesh  for  the  opposition of  the  Asian  highway scheme  feel  that:
 Transit  facility  once  given  is  difficult to take back.
 It may give rise to more violent acts of terrorism and insurgency
 With  the  availability  of  transit facilities  to  the  North‐eastern  Indian states  that  now  depend  on Bangladesh  for  imports  would  move towards  selling  its  own  products  to the region and Bangladesh will lose.
 There is a fear of destroying the roads and  highways  of  Bangladesh  by  the Indian  traders  and  gradually  military personnel passing through.
 There  is  an  abundant  lack  of  trust between  India  and  Bangladesh  that resulted  from  India’s  contradicted position  on  the  Farakka  Barrage  and the sharing of Ganga Water. The  Chittagong port  can  become  a modern  busy  port  like  Singapore  and China serving the SAARC countries.
  Huge  foreign  investment  may  be attracted by Bangladesh and  finally, a throbbing  servic sector  like  banks, insurance,  hotels,  rest  houses,  petrol pumps  etc.  may  develop  around  theTranscontinental roads and railways.
 There  is  an  estimate  of  direct economic  gain  from  transit  fees.  It ranges  from  500  crore  taka  to  4,666 crore taka.
 The  mutual  transit  will  give Bangladesh  a  much  shorter  route  to China and an initiative to link Chinese province  of  Yunan with  Seven Sisters of  India,  Myanmar,  Thailand  and Bangladesh.

III

WATER

For  centuries,  natural  resources  have been  a  source  of  continual  conflict between nations,though unlike oil, which till  is  a  major  cause  of  discord  between nations,  water  remains  a  less disputed issue.  But  this  varies  regionally.  In  the Middle  Eastern  and  North  African  states,water  has been  shaping  relationships within the region’s states.  The Farakka BarrageThe  origin  of  the dispute  can  be  traced back  to the  Treaty  of  Friendship, Cooperation  and  Peace  signed  by  then indian  Prime  Minister
Indira  Gandhi  and Bangladesh’s  founding  leader  and  Prime Minister  Sheik  Mujibur  Rahman on 19 March, 1972. According  to  the  treaty,  the two  nations  established  a  Joint  River Commission to  work  towards  the common  interests  and  sharing  of  water resources,  irrigation,  floods  and cyclone control.  As  per  the  treaty,  the  Farakka Barrage  was  built  in  1974,  about  10 kilometers from  the  border  of Bangladesh,  controlling  the  flow  of  the Ganges,  possessing  strong economic and religious  importance,  diverting  some  of the  water  into  a  feeder  canal  linking  the Hooghly River, keeping it silt free.With  increasing  demands  for  water  in Kolkata  for  industrial  and domestic  use, and  for  irrigational  purposes  in  other parts  of  West  Bengal,  dispute  over  the sharing  of  water  is  intensifying.  The objective  behind  the  construction  of  the Farakka Barrage was to increase the lean period  flow  of  the  Bhagirathi‐Hooghly river branch of the Ganges to increase the water  depth  at  the  Kolkata  port  which was threatened by siltation. In November 1977 the  two  countries  proposed  a  five year  agreement  on  water  sharing. However,  the  basic  issue remained unaddressed, leading to its lapse in 1982. Finally  a  comprehensive  bilateral  treaty was signed  by  the  Indian  Prime minister H.  D.  Deve  Gowda  and  his  Bangladeshi counterpart Sheikh Hasina  Wajed  on  12 December, 1996. This treaty established a thirty  year  water  sharing arrangement with  guaranteed  minimum  quantities  of water  supply  for  Bangladesh,  whose lights as  a  lower  riparian  country  was recognized. The  30  year  water  sharing  treaty envisaged  that the  water  of  the  Ganges River would  be  distributed  from  Farakka for  the  two countries between 1  January and  31  May  of  each  year,  and  that  India was  required  to  maintain  the flow  of Farakka  at  the  average  level  of  the previous  40  years  including  any  critical period  when Bangladesh  would  continue to receive 35000 cusec of flow. This treaty essentially regarded the lean season flows related  to  actual  flows  at  various  levels not  exceeding  75%  dependable  flows,  as
in  past  agreements.  The  basic  formula  of equal  sharing  during  the  lean  season flows had  two modifications at  the upper and  lower  extremes.  Governmental interpretation  says  that  this  treaty is successful in settling the dispute over the sharing  of  water,  but  contrary  views  on the  part  of India  and  Bangladesh  have been  extended  over  this  treaty  that  also has the provision of being reviewed at the end  of  five  years,  or  even  at  the  end  of two years, if so wished. The Bangladeshi view suggests:
 There  was  unilateral  diversion  of Ganga  water  by  India  at  Farakka prior  to  the  30  year  water  sharing treaty.
 This  was a case of a large and more powerful  country  disregarding  the needs  and  interests  of  a  small  and weaker  neighbor,  resulting  in reduction  in  flows  that  had  serious adverse  effects  on Bangladesh.  This view  further  ascribes  to  the  big brotherly  attitude  of  India  over  her neighbours.8
 Critics  also  emphasized environmental  hazards  such  as raised  salinity  levels,  contaminated fisheries,  hindered  navigation  and  a threat  to  the  water  quality  and quantity.  Silt  levels  were believed  to have  an  adverse  effect  on  the Hooghly River and the Kolkata Port. The Indian view suggests:
 That  the  water  allocated  to Bangladesh  leaves  India  with  less water necessary for the functioning of the  Kolkata  port  and  the  National Thermal  Power  Corporation  at Farakka.
 Bangladesh  has  taken  an unnecessarily  rigid  and  unreasonable stand  on  this  issue.  Greatly overstating  its  water  needs, Bangladesh claims a disproportionate share of water. Bangladesh  High Commissioner  to  India Mr.  H.E.  Tariq  A.  Karim,  during  his address  at  the  Institute  of  Peace and Conflict  Studies  in  New  Delhi,  regarding water  sharing  between  India  and Bangladesh commented  that “Transparency  in  these  matters  is  very important…India  and  Bangladesh  must
not quibble about cusecs or percentage ofshare  and  realize  that  water  is  an intangible  asset  that does  not  recognize political  boundaries…there  should  be  an emphasis  on  water  conservation and optimum water management”.9

Teesta River Dispute 

The Teesta River enters Bangladesh near Nilphamari  district  and  courses  45 kilometers through the predominant rice‐growing districts of Rangpur, Lalmonirhat and  Gaibandha  before meeting  the Brahmaputra  River  in  Kunigram.  The Teesta  River  floodplain  that  includes the extreme  northwest  region  of  the  country accounts  for  14%  of  the  total  cropped area in  2001.  Around  63%  of  the  total cropped  area  in  the  region  is  irrigated laying  down  a direct  link  between irrigational  water  availability  and agricultural  use.  The  floodplain which  is presently considered a dry zone depends on  the  Trans  Boundary  River  flows between India and Bangladesh.  Sheikh  Hasina  in  her  three  day  visit  to India on 10 January 2010 exchanged draft agreements  on  the  Teesta  water  sharing issue  with  India, after  a  two‐day ministerial level meeting of the Joint River Commission  was  held.  While Bangladesh presented  a  draft  on  an  interim agreement,  India  presented  a  draft  of  a Statement  of Principles  on  the  sharing  of river  water  during  the  dry  season. The immediate  achievement  of  this  meeting was  the  decision  that,  within  a  year,  an agreement  over  the  Teesta  River  water sharing would be signed. It would provide key support  to agricultural production in the  northwest  region  of  Bangladesh.  One question that remained  unanswered regarded the amount of river water likely to  be  shared  between the countries. Critics  suggest  a  joint  initiative  to  be undertaken  by  India  and  Bangladesh,  to build reservoirs in both the countries that would  help  in  storing  the  excess  water during  the  rainy  season  and  utilize  it during the dry seasons. 

IV

BORDER

      Land Border       

India  and  Bangladesh  share  almost  4096 kilometers  of  land  border,  whereas official  records suggest  that  only  6.5 kilometers  of  land  along  the  Comilla‐Tripura  border is  considered  as officially disputed  by  the  governments  of  both countries.  But  the  border  disputes between Bangladesh  and  India  are  by  no means confined to demarcation problems. It  is  further  linked with  other  problems like illegal migration of people and goods and other cross border criminal activities. Within  just  six  weeks  of  partition,  the border  between  India  and  Pakistan  was drawn by Sir Cyril Radcliff on the basis of the Two Nation Theory. This provided for India’s  control  over 112  enclaves  and Bangladesh’s  control  over  32  enclaves based  on  the  religious  identities  of the inhabitants  of  those areas. An agreement was  signed  by  the  Presidents  of  the  two
countries  in  1972  but  since  it  was  not ratified  by  India  it  could  not  be  put  into
ffect.  On  the  other  hand  Bangladesh’s immediate  ratification  of  the  treaty  and the  fulfillment of its  obligation  gave  way to  the  return  of  Berubari  to  India  by Bangladesh,  while  India  gave permission to  Bangladesh  to  use  the  Tin  Bigha corridor in 1992 which would work as an entrance to  Bangladesh’s  enclaves  inside India.

Boundary Dispute

The boundary dispute between  India and Bangladesh  in  April  2001  worsened relations.  It  raised questions  about  the survival  of  the  newly  installed  Hasina government.  Border  skirmishes occurred around  the  village  of  Padua,  also  known as  Pyrdiwah,  in  India  adjoining  the  state
of  Meghalaya  and  the  Timbli  area  of Sylhet  district in  Bangladesh.  It  was  held that  India  had illegal  possession  of  the area since 1971. Attention to the disputed area  was  drawn  to Bangladesh when  the Indian  forces  attempted  to  construct  a footpath  from  an  army  outpost  in  Padua across  the  disputed  territory  some  300 meters wide  to Meghalaya. The refusal of he  Indian forces to  withdraw  led  to  the conflict that lasted from 16th to the 19th of April killing 16 Indian and 11 Bangladeshi soldiers.;  243  people  were  killed  due  to exchange of firing between security forces of both  countries, and  further led  10,000 Bangladeshi  and  1000  Indians  to  flee from  the  disputed area  because  of  the ongoing tension.  

Maritime border

While  Bangladesh,  having  concave coastlines,  delimits  its  sea  border southward  from  the  edge of  its  land boundary,  India  stretches  its  claim southeast  wards,  covering  around thousands  of miles  in  the  Bay  of  Bengal. Due  to  competing  claims  of  the  two countries,  delimitation  of the sea boundary  and  determining  Bangladesh’s exclusive economic zones have  remained unresolved. Moreover,  in  terms  of determining  the  continental shelf,  the presence  of  the  Andamans  and Nicobar Islands puts India, in a favorable position. Territorial Waters The  issue  of  demarcating territorial waters led to serious differences between the  two  countries.  Questions  of ownership over a new born island known as South Talpatty in Bangladesh and New Moore/  Purbasha  in  India spotted  by  a satellite picture in 1975 in  the estuary of Haribhanga  River  on  the  border  of  the two countries  has  been  a  source  of contention since its discovery. In order to settle  the  above  dispute Bangladesh proposed sending a joint Indo‐Bangladesh team to determine the flow of channels of the river  on  the  basis  of  existing International  Law  of  the  Sea.  But  the Indian  counterpart  sent forces  to establish  claims  by  stationing  naval troops on  the island in 1981. After initial resentment by  Bangladesh,  India  agreed to resolve the issue through negotiations. Till  now  the  sovereignty over  the  island nation  remains      undecided,  and  recent reports  of  the  press  and  media suggests that  Bangladesh  views  India  with suspicion  in  its  activities  over  the disputed piece of landmass on  the breast of an international water.

V

SECURITY CONCERNS

Illegal immigration is a perennial problem in  almost  all  nations.  Problems  of immigration considered illegal have even led  to  the  outbreaks  of  xenophobic violence  in  certain  places.  India has completed around 1357 kilometer fencing of  the international  border  with  plans  to cover another  2429  kilometer  of  border in  the  second  phase  and  also  plans  to illuminate  around  300 kilometer  of international  border  to  prevent  illegal migration.  Cooperative  measures  like joint patrolling  of  the  border  areas, consular access  to  prisons and  signing  of an  extradition  treaty are on  the  verge  of materializing as  steps  to increase  vigil  to check  drug  and  arms  trafficking,  as well as  illegal  immigration,  especially  the trafficking  women  and  children.  The Centre  for Women  and  Children  Studies based  in  Bangladesh  estimated  in  1998 that 27,000 Bangladeshis had been forced into  prostitution  in  India.  Illegal Bangladeshi  migrants  enter  Indian Territory  to settle  in  rural  areas  like Nandigram  in  West  Bengal,  as  share croppers. In  the Northeastern states like Nagaland, the  population  of  Bangladeshi,  mostly Muslim  immigrants,  have  more than
tripled  in  the  past  decade,  from  20,000 Bangladeshi immigrants in 1991, to more than 75,000 as of 2001. Drug TraffickingBangladesh is increasingly being used as a transit point by drug dealers and the drug mafia,  which  dispatches  heroin  and opium  from  Burma,  and  other  countries of  the golden  triangle,  to  different destinations.  As  a  result,  Bangladesh’s Department  of  Narcotic Control  has come under the scanner several times and invited  criticism. Bangladesh  has  become the  prime  transit  route  for  trafficking heroin  to  Europe  from  Southeast  Asia, according  to  a report  from  the International  Narcotics  Control  Board (INCB) 2007 annual report’10 .
INCB  notes  that  the  most  common methods and routes for smuggling heroin into  Bangladesh  are by  courier  from Pakistan,  commercial  vehicles  and  trains from India, and via sea through the Bay of Bengal  or  overland  by  truck  or  public transport from Burma. Anti Terror Cooperation The Ministry of Defence,  India, expressed its  interest  in  seeking  Bangladesh’s  ‘firm cooperation’  in fighting  anti‐India  terror and  insurgent  outfits  operating  from  its soil. The armies of both countries have, in the  past,  proved  their  might  by  fighting the  ULFA  cadres,  by,  for  example, the handing over of Arabinda Rajkowa  to  the Indian Security agencies. Bangladeshi  attempts  to cooperate  with India  on  anti‐terror  grounds,  recognized that  some  Pakistan  based  terror  outfits
had formed a strong nexus with militants in  Bangladesh,  because  of  its  close proximity to Indiawith its porous border, to  carry  out  attacks  in  India.  India  has vital  security  related concerns  vis‐à‐vis Bangladesh  such  as  sanctuaries  enjoyed by  indigenous  Indian  ethnic  terrorist organizations like ULFA, activities of trans border  Islamic  terrorist  groups  like Muslim  Liberation Tigers  of  Assam (MULTA),  the  Independent  Liberation Army  of  Assam  (ILAA)  and  the People United  Liberation  Front  (PULF),  the activities  from  Bangladesh  territory  of pro‐AL  Qaeda organizations  of  Pakistani origins  supported  by  the  ISI  such  as  the LeT,  HuJI,  and  Harkat‐ul‐Mujahideen (HuM),  gun  running  in  India’s  northeast from  and  through  Bangladesh,  illegal migration  into  Assam  and  West  Bengal, the  flow  of  funds  from  Wahabi  charity organizations in  Saudi  Arabia  to fundamentalist  elements  in  Bangladesh‐India  region,  money  laundering through India‐Nepal and  India‐Bangladesh region, etc.  India  is  often  seen  as  a  big  power  with hegemonistic  tendencies  amongst  its neighbors  in  the  subcontinent. Bangladesh,  in  relation  to India,  has  to take  note  of  the  large  anti‐Indian sentiments  presiding  in  its  soil.  After  all, no successful  democracy  can  avoid  the feelings  and  sentiments  of  its  people.  In fact,  the sustenance  of  a  democracy depends on the will of the people, and the performance of a democracy is measured by the scale of fulfillment of the wishes of its people.

VI

EXTERNAL INFLUENCES

A  perplexing  issue  the  Prime  minister  of Bangladesh faced before her visit to India in  January 2010  was  whether  to  visit India  or  China  first.  Bangladesh,  has always  used  China  as  a counter  balance against  India,  was  generous  this  time towards  India,  when  Prime  Minister
Sheikh Hasina decided  to visit her  Indian counterpart,  Prime  Minister  Manmohan Singh first.
A  major  setback  to  the  enthusiasm  in India of Hasina’s visit, came in the form of her  visit  to China immediately  after  that, wherein  a  communiqué  was  issued, consisting  of  similar  transit facilities given  to  China  as  given  to  India. Bangladesh  sought  Chinese  assistance  in constructing  a  highway  passing  through Myanmar  to  Yunan  province  in  China.  A rail  network passing  through  the  same area  has  been  proposed. Bangladesh was also  reportedly  engaged  in persuading China  to  further  develop  and  use  the Chittagong  port  and  develop  a  deep  sea port at  Sonadia  Island.  This  becomes problematic  for  India  who  fears  China’s access  to  the Myanmar  naval  base  in Hanggyi  Islands  and  the  monitoring station,  established  at  Coco  Island  in  the north  of  India’s  Andaman  and  Nicobar Islands.  India  fears China encircling  India as part of its String of Pearls strategy. The relationship  between  China  and Bangladesh  since  1975 influences Bangladesh  to  move  away  from  India. Bangladesh  maintains  a  very  close relationship  with  China  for  its  economic and military needs.11  Over the years, the two sides have signed a  plethora  of  bilateral  agreements including  economic  engagements,  soft loans,  social contacts,  cultural exchanges, academic  interactions,  infrastructural development  and  military sales at reduced  prices,  with  China  emerging  as the  major  supplier  of  arms  to Bangladesh’s  armed forces.  China  and Bangladesh  along  with  Myanmar,  have decided  to  build  the  900  kilometer Kunming  Highway  linking  Chittagong with  Kunming  through  Myanmar  to facilitate  greater trade.  Dhaka‐Beijing relations  have  reached  new  heights  as China  overtook  India  as Bangladesh’s largest  trading  partner.  In  addition  to economic  engagement,  Bangladesh  and China  in  2005  signed  the  Bangladesh‐China  Cooperation  Agreement  on  the Peaceful  Usage  of Nuclear  Energy  which aims  to  assist  Bangladesh  in  developing peaceful  nuclear  energy  for power generation  and  other  developmental purposes  and  a  Defense  Cooperation Agreement with China in 2002. India,  considers  South  Asia  as  its backyard,  exerting  influence  over  it,  and so  a growing  relationship  between  China and  Bangladesh  is  visualized  by  India  as potentially problematic.  Bangladesh  tries to bargain between  India and China,  thus standing  only  to  gain. Apart  from  that, Bangladesh’s  government  over  the  years has  been  characterized  by  one favoring India, and one against it. Additionally, the Chinese  quest  for  regional  power  and
hen  global  power  should  be  taken  into account.  This  quest  is  based  on  the sustained and dedicated engagement with India’s  neighbors  for  access  and  basing. Therefore,  Bangladesh  has been  an obvious choice for partnership.

VI

CONCLUSIONS

Bangladesh‐India relations over the years reflect  the  prominence  of  coercive elements  in  India’s hegemonic  role  in South Asia. This perception will affect the development  of  long  term institutional relationships  with  smaller  neighbors  of South  Asia.  This  was  clearly  reflected  in
India’s  aversion  towards  multilateral cooperation  frameworks  like  SAARC  and the  lack  of reciprocation  in  trade  and economic  cooperation  with  countries,  as seen with Bangladesh. The United  States’  hegemony  over  the years  achieved  a  boost  with  its involvement  with  smaller and  weaker neighboring  allies  in  several  economic and  security  cooperation  ventures  like the  NATO  and  NAFTA.  But  India’s influence  in  a  regional  context  results  in discontentment  on the  part  of  weaker states.  Thus,  India  should  rely  on  an institutional  doctrine  with  greater involvement  with  smaller  and  weaker neighboring  states  with  an  aim  to  aid their  efforts  to develop  themselves  in various fields.  The  history  of  the  formation  of  the European  Union  as  a powerful  regional bloc  shows  a  greater  compromise  on  the part  of  bigger  states  like  France and Germany  to  achieve  regional  cohesion and  peaceful  relations.  India,  too,  should prepare itself  to  compromise  on  certain fronts if regional cohesion and peace is to be achieved. India’s relationship  with  all  South  Asian countries  should  not  be  dictated  by  its relationship  with Pakistan  and  China, with  whom  it  has  undergone  prolonged conflict  and  competition.  If  India wishes to  continue  its  relationship  with Bangladesh,  it  needs  to  take  a  good  look at  the stand it takes  towards other South Asian countries also. A hegemonic stance by India would have significant impact on the Indo‐Bangladesh relations.